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WISCONSIN v. MITCHELL
113 S.Ct. 2194 (1993)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Todd Mitchell was convicted in Kenosha
County, Wisconsin, of aggravated battery and theft,
an offense which normally carries a maximum two
year prison sentence in Wisconsin. However, because
Mitchell selected his victim solely on account of the
victim's race, Mitchell received four years.'
On the October 7, 1989, Mitchell was among
a group of young black men and boys in an apart-
ment in Kenosha, Wisconsin. The group discussed
a scene from the motion picture Mississippi Burn-
ing, where a white man beat up a black boy who
was praying. Shortly thereafter, several members of
the group attacked fourteen year old Gregory
Riddick. Riddick, a white boy, apparently did noth-
ing to provoke the attack. The group beat and kicked
Riddick so severely that he remained comatose for
four days.
While Mitchell did not participate in the beat-
ing, he allegedly made two statements prior to the
beating. First, Mitchell asked the group, "Do you all
feel hyped up to move on some white people?"2
Then, as Riddick walked by, Mitchell pointed at him
and said, "You all want to [expletive] somebody up?
There goes a white boy; go get him."
3
Mitchell's sentence was affirmed by the Wis-
consin Court of Appeals, but reversed by the Wis-
consin Supreme Court on the basis that "the statute
unconstitutionally infringes upon free speech."4 The
A penalty enhancement statute was part of the
Wisconsin law when Mitchell committed the crime. At
the time of Mitchell's trial Wisconsin statute § 939.645
(1989-1990) included the following provisions:
(1) If a person does all of the following, the pen-
alties for the underlying crime are increased as provided
in sub. (2):
(a) Commits a crime under chs. 939 to 948.
(b) Intentionally selects the person against whom
the crime under par. (a) is committed or selects the prop-
erty which is damaged or otherwise affected by the crime
under par. (a) because of the race, religion, color, disabil-
ity, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that
person or the owner or occupant of that property.
(2)(c) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is
a felony, maximum fine prescribed by law for the crime
may be increased by not more than $5,000 and the maxi-
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the statute
punished bigoted thought, not conduct, in that it
"punishes the 'because of' aspect of the defendant's
selection, the reason the defendant selected the vic-
tim, the motive behind the selection."5 The Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court also held the statute to be "un-
constitutionally overbroad because it sweeps pro-
tected First Amendment speech within its reach and
thereby chills free speech."6 It distinguished antidis-
crimination statutes from hate crimes statutes; while
it acknowledged the impact and harm of hate crimes,
it declared the right to free speech more important
than the deterrence of such crimes.
7
The State appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court. The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari because of the importance of the question pre-
sented and conflicts among state high courts con-
cerning the constitutionality of penalty enhancement
statutes."
HOLDING
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court.The Court held that the
State's enhanced-penalty statute did not violate the
defendant's First Amendment right to free speech
or beliefs.9 The statute was not unconstitutionally
overbroad and would not effect the right to free
speech in Wisconsin.' 0
mum period of imprisonment prescribed by law for the
crime may be increased by not more than 5 years.
(3) This section provides for the enhancement
of the penalties applicable for the underlying crime_ The
court shall direct that the trier of fact find a special ver-
dict as to all of the issues specified in sub. (1).
2 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S.Ct. 2194,2196 (1993)
(citing Brief for Petitioner at 4).
3 Id. at 2197 (citing Brief for Petitioner, at 4-5).
4 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 808 (Wis.
1992), rev'd. & remanded, 473 N.W2d I (Wi. 1991).
5 State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807,815 (Wis. 1992).
6 Id. at 816.
7 Id. at 817.
8 Mitchell, 113 S.Ct. at 2198.
9 Id. at 2199-2200.
10 Id. at 2201.
ANALYSIS/ APPLICATION
In a unanimous decision written by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, the Court declared that the Wiscon-
sin penalty enhancement statute does not violate
the defendant's right to freedom of speech or be-
liefs. The Court first clarified that the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's characterization of the penalty
enhancement statute was not binding on the Court."
The Court conceded that it is "bound by a state
court's construction of a state statute."' 2 The Court
then qualified this concession with the declaration
that a state court's construction is only binding with
regard to the meaning of a particular word or phrase
within a statute, not the practical effect of the stat-
ute.'3 Therefore, while the state court may construe
the practical effect of the statute in one manner, the
Court has the right to construe the practical effect
of the statute in another, regardless of the state
court's construction.'
4
The Court did not accept the State's claim that
the statute only punished conduct, not bigoted
thought.' The same assault, committed by two de-
fendants, one of whom selected the victim because
of race while the other did not, would result in the
first defendant receiving a tougher sentence under
the penalty-enhancement statute. "'Thus, more than
conduct is punished under the statute. 7 The Court
pointed out that sentencing judges consider many
factors other than conduct when setting a
defendant's sentence.' For example, "it is not un-
common for a defendant to receive a minimum sen-
tence because he was acting with good motives, or a
rather high sentence because of his bad motives.""9
Obviously, the Court did not imply that a sen-
tencing judge is able to consider all factors in deter-
mining a sentence. In Dawson v. Delaware,211 the
Court held that "a defendant's abstract beliefs, how-
ever obnoxious to most people, may not be taken
into consideration by a sentencing judge"'2 How-
" Id. at 2198-99.
'z Id. at 2198 (citing R.A.V v. St. Paul, 112 S.Ct. 2538,
2541-2542 (1992)).
13 Id.





'9 Id. (citing Tson v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156
(1987)).
2" 112 S.Ct. 1093 (1992).
21 Id. at 1098.
22 Id. at 1094.
ever, the Dawson Court also declared that the "the
Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to the
admission of evidence concerning one's beliefs and
associations at sentencing simply because those be-
liefs and associations are protected by the First
Amendment."22 Thus, in Barclay v. Florida,23 a black
defendant's membership in the Black Liberation
Army and the defendant's willingness to start a race
war were factors a judge could consider in sentenc-
ing the defendant to death for the murder of a white
man.24 The Mitchell Court distinguished Dawson, a
case where the defendant's beliefs were not related
to the defendant's crime, and Barclay, a case where
the defendant's beliefs were considered a motivat-
ing factor in the crime.25 Mitchell argued that
Dawson and Barclay did not apply to the case at bar
because neither case involved a penalty enhance-
ment statute.26 The Court dismissed this claim by
pointing out that Barclay involved a death sentence,
which the Court characterized as "surely the most
severe enhancement of all."27
Mitchell also argued for the invalidity of the stat-
ute based on the grounds that the statute "punishes
the defendant's motive, or reason, for acting."28 How-
ever, the Court was not convinced by this claim ei-
ther. Rather, the Court noted that motive plays the
same role as it does in federal and state antidiscrimi-
nation laws which bar intentional discrimination.'
R.A. V v. St. PauP does not mandate the Court
to strike down the Wisconsin statute.3' That case, at
a first reading, appeared to advance Mitchell's con-
stitutional claim. In R.A.V, the Court struck down
St. Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance on the
grounds that the ordinance was invalid under the
First Amendment.3 2 The R.A.V defendant was
charged under the St. Paul ordinance for burning a
cross in a black family's yard.33 The Mitchell Court
distinguished the St. Paul ordinance from the Wis-
consin statute on the grounds that the ordinance
attempted to prohibit or proscribe "'fighting words'
23 463 U.S. 939 (1983).
24 Id. at 942-944.





31, 112 S.Ct. 2538 (1992).
31 Id.
32 Id. at 2550.
33 Minn. Stat. § 292.02 (1990) contains the follow-
ing language:
Whoever places on public or private property a sym-
bol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, includ-
deemed particularly offensive by the city."34 The St.
Paul ordinance attempted to proscribe speech or
expression, while the Wisconsin statute addressed
conduct unprotected by the First Amendment
s.3
Thus, the state is entitled to punish some forms of
forbidden conduct more harshly than others if it
determines such penalty enhancement is appropri-
ate.
The Court noted that the Wisconsin legislature
had commendable motives for constructing such a
statute.36 The Court recognized that hate crimes
often provoke retaliation and stir up community
unrest; also, such crimes are particularly hard on the
victims.3 ' The Court rejected Mitchell's claim that
the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad because
a potential defendant, fearing punishment for an
uncommitted crime, may be chilled in the exercise
of free expression.The Court characterized the claim
as being "too speculative."38 Moreover, the Court
stated that previous declarations by a defendant may
be introduced at a trial to show evidence of a
defendant's motive or intent, so long as such state-
ments comply with evidentiary rules.3 9 The case was
remanded for further proceedings.
CONCLUSION
In Mitchell, the Court has taken a stand in hopes
of deterring hate crimes; needless to say the deci-
sion has drawn much criticism. Many experts criti-
cize hate crime statutes on First Amendment
grounds, 40 arguing that "these laws tread dangerously
close to criminalization of speech and thought, that
they impermissibly distinguish among people based
on their beliefs, and that they are frequently too
vaguely drafted to provide adequate notice of pro-
hibited conduct."4'
ing, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika,
which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know
arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disor-
derly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
14 Mitchell, 113 S.Ct. at 2200.





4 ' See Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail,
but Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and
Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA
L.Rev. 333, 334 (1991).
4, Id. at 334.
According to the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, "[a] total of 4,558 hate crime indictments in-
volving 4,755 offenses were reported in 1991.,,4 The
FBI further concluded that of all the hate crimes
reported "60% were allegedly motivated by racial
bias, 20% were motivated by religious bias, and eth-
nic bias and sexual orientation each motivated 10%
of the hate crimes reported."43 Gaumer points out
that hate crimes have become more prevalent in the
last few years.4 4 Some experts believe hate crime
figures underestimate the actual number of incidents
because many incidents presumably do not get re-
ported or police officers simply fail to recognize cer-
tain hate crimes as being such.
45
Perhaps in this case, the Court sends a message
to our citizens and courts that where hate crimes
are concerned, enough is enough. Over the last few
years state legislatures have recognized the extent
and consequences of hate crimes, and in response
many have drafted statutes similar to that of Wis-
consin.4 6 In Mitchell, the Court firmly endorses one
such statute with a brief and unanimous opinion
that makes a controversial constitutional topic seem
clear and undisputed. In so doing, the Court recog-
nizes that hate crimes are prevalent in our society
and such crimes are damaging not only to the vic-
tims but also others who share their race, sex, color,
religion, disability, sexual orientation, or national
origin. Mitchell thus gives guidance to legislatures in
drafting hate crime statutes that do not offend the
Constitution. The existence of statutes will not stop
all hate crimes, but all citizens should hope that such
statutes will be a deterrence.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Mark C. Thackston
42 See Gaumer, Punishment for Prejudice: A Commen-
tary on the Constitutionality and Utility of State Statutory
Responses to the Problems of Hate Crimes, 39 S.D. L. Rev.
1, 5 (1994) (citing the United States Department of Jus-




45 See Ho, Substantive Penal Hate Crime Legislatiom:
Toward Defining Constitutional Guidelines Following the
R.A.V v. City of St. Paul and Wisconsin v. Mitchell Deci-
sions, 34 Santa Clara L. Rev. 711, 719-20 (1994) (citing
U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Civil Rights Issues Facing
Asian Americans in the 1990's, at 48 (1992)).
46 Id. at 713.
